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Abstract 
  
The world is facing a new round of international tax competition that may 
result in a ruinous race to the bottom, undermining the fiscal capacity of 
states to respond to global challenges and to implement the Agenda 2030. 
G20 leaders must take action to strengthen multilateral and cooperative 
approaches to taxation, curtail harmful tax competition and protect their own 
tax base as well as that of developing countries. 
 
Challenge  
 
Tax competition may be an important tool to attract investment, but more 
often than not it undermines the capacity of governments to mobilize 
sufficient resources to finance public services - including those services that 
are essential for sustainable development and economic growth. Particularly 
harmful are tax competition practices that a) erode the tax bases of other 
countries, thereby diminishing global welfare, b) deny other countries the 
opportunity to adapt their tax regimes in response to unwanted spillovers, 
due to a lack of transparency of the measures, or c) introduce market 
distortions in favor of specific groups or actors by shifting the tax burden to 
the disadvantage of other groups or actors, thereby undermining the fairness 
and social acceptance of tax systems.  
 
The US tax reform of December 2017 threatens to trigger another round of 
worldwide tax competition, as other G20 governments may feel urged to 
adjust their corporate tax regimes as well. We see the risk of a downward 
spiral driven by three mechanisms: 
 
• First, race-to-the-bottom corporate tax competition may involve 
lowering statutory tax rates as well as providing additional tax breaks 
for specific types of economic activity. In particular the latter tend to 
be harmful because they distort markets.  
 
• Second, preferential tax regimes, distorting investment incentives and 
so-called anti-abuse rules as in the case of the US tax reform affect the 
level playing field significantly. If other countries react with similar 
measures, the resulting global tax structure could be even more 
complex and mutually harmful. 
 
• Third, while tax cuts might boost economic growth in the short run, 
growing budgetary deficits could be a hindrance to growth in the 
medium term, as higher budget deficits would push up interest rates, 
which would discourage investment. For instance, the US tax reform is 
expected to cause an additional deficit of between USD 0.5 and 1.5 
trillion over the coming decade, depending on the source of the 
estimation. This limits the space for public policies in the future and  
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puts a strain on coming generations, especially against the background 
of already high public debt rates in the US. If other governments would 
follow suit, fiscal space would shrink globally and limit resource 
availability for promoting balanced, sustainable and inclusive growth. 
 
The consequences are likely to differ across countries: 
 
• First, industrialized countries could see their tax base affected by a new 
round of corporate tax competition. By contrast, many developing 
countries might be less directly affected by this type of tax competition 
- either because they seek investments in sectors where market 
barriers exist (for instance, extractive industries) or because they 
already offer generous tax breaks in highly competitive sectors. 
However, they are likely to suffer from indirect effects, as their 
revenues from direct taxes are often heavily dependent on corporate 
taxation, the lion's share of which is typically borne by a small number 
of multinational corporations (MNCs). Developing countries could be 
under pressure to raise indirect taxes, shifting the tax burden further 
from corporations to consumers, particularly middle- and low-income 
sectors.  
 
• Second, in addition, many measures already undertaken or foreseen by 
G20 member countries (such as for instance certain tax incentives for 
research and development) create additional competitive advantages 
for large MNCs which might lead to new distortions in the economic 
structure of countries worldwide, thereby affecting the capabilities of 
national economies to innovate, create jobs and adapt to the 
transformation of global production patterns, in particular to the 
growing digitalization of the world economy. 
 
Proposal  
 
Abolishing and preventing economic distortions of the kind outlined above 
should be a main goal of international tax policy. We ask G20 leaders to take 
urgent and decisive action in two distinctive though interrelated topics: (a) 
reverse the current tendency to engage in harmful tax competition and (b) 
provide a level playing field for taxation and investment. 
 
1. Reverse the current tendency to engage in harmful tax competition 
 
G20 leaders should deepen cooperation with regard to the exchange of tax-
related information and the fight against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS)  
 
Unilateral action by individual countries, as powerful as they may be, is not 
an adequate response to the requirements of taxing a globalised economy. 
Any gains arising from such action will be short-lived, as other countries are  
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likely to introduce compensatory measures and economic actors should be 
expected to quickly adapt to the changing conditions. 
 
A change of investment behaviour due to tax reforms is not necessarily 
negative, but cooperation should take account of differences in capacities of 
developed and developing countries to undertake appropriate action. 
Research shows that countries are taking different approaches to the 
implementation of BEPS Actions (IBFD 2018, Mosquera Valderrama 2018), 
leading to peculiar and undesired forms of tax competition. We observe that 
countries implementing BEPS are sometimes in disadvantage with respect to 
countries that are not implementing BEPS. For instance, BEPS minimum 
standard Action 6, which aims at "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits 
in Inappropriate Circumstances" foresees the inclusion of principal purpose 
tests (PPT) in tax treaties. These tests create an extra requirement for 
taxpayers who are investing in that country. Discretionary application of the 
principal purpose test by tax administrations can introduce additional 
distortions in the global competition for investments. In this sense, balancing 
competition and BEPS implementation is needed to achieve a global model 
of tax governance in which developed and developing countries compete on 
a level playing field. 
 
We ask the G20 leaders to promote regional cooperation in the 
implementation of international standards, including BEPS. The G20 should 
facilitate the creation of regional (or sub-regional) peer review and 
consultancy mechanisms that would allow countries to set and revise their 
own goals and targets for implementation, getting regular feedback from 
neighbouring countries. The G20 should actively promote regional learning 
processes: To give an example, the exchange of information (for instance, on 
trade flows and taxation) between neighbouring countries could be used to 
jointly implement technical platforms and standards and to build 
administrative capacity. This would make countries fit for the exchange of 
information on a broader international scale and allow them to better use that 
information locally. 
 
G20 leaders should agree on a minimum corporate tax rate 
 
Tax competition has harmful consequences for the global provision of public 
goods when effective tax rates of all countries end up below the level that 
countries would have chosen if no measure to attract foreign tax bases was 
introduced or if no reaction to other countries' measures was required. This 
has distributional effects to the disadvantage of immobile factors and 
impedes a fair sharing of the burden of financing sustainable development 
between all economic actors. Currently, average statutory corporate tax 
rates around the world are converging at around 25 per cent. Many tax 
havens apply much lower rates. While the BEPS project tackles some of the 
most pressing issues regarding corporate tax evasion and avoidance, it only 
marginally addresses the problem of  tax competition. Initiatives on tax 
coordination between countries only exist at a regional level within the EU  
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and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). A practical 
approach towards establishing a minimum level of tax coordination about 
particularly harmful practices of corporate taxation would be to agree on a 
minimum corporate tax rate.   
 
G20 leaders should explore the possibility of introducing a minimum 
corporate tax rate to be applied to the worldwide profits of private 
companies. Such a common minimum corporate tax rate would stop 
rewarding tax havens and prevent a race to the bottom, while keeping G20-
based multinational companies, as well as other companies and permanent 
establishments operating in G20 countries, on a level-playing field with 
competitors. Such a minimum tax rate should help limit both tax avoidance 
and harmful tax competition. The determination of corporate tax rates above 
the minimum level would remain subject to the national tax rules. 
 
2. Provide a level playing field for taxation and investment 
 
G20 leaders should Improve the transparency of tax instruments for the 
attraction of investments 
 
We ask G20 leaders to ensure that tax instruments used for the attraction of 
investments are employed with a view on creating, rather than undermining 
the level-playing field for investors. Clarity, simplicity and reliability are 
relevant criteria in this context. Measures to improve the design and 
transparency of tax incentives are presented in the T20 Policy Brief on "Tax 
Expenditure and the Treatment of Tax Incentives for Investment". 
 
G20 leaders should work towards a common corporate tax base and explore 
ways to treat multinationals as single entities 
 
Some progress has been made in addressing tax avoidance by multinational 
corporations in recent years. Much remains to be done, however. We ask G20 
leaders to engage in a strategic debate on a reform of tax systems to make 
these fit for purpose in a globalised economy in which many companies 
operate across borders, but are managed as one single entity. A first step in 
this direction would be to broaden existing initiatives under the BEPS project, 
especially regarding the digital economy, as the delay in the introduction of 
tax measures to address the challenges of digitalization implies, in practice, 
an underlying preferential tax regime.  
 
A second step would be to agree on a common corporate tax base (CCTB), 
applying harmonized nexus and profit allocation concepts in line with the 
exigencies of digitalization. As a third, longer-term measure, introducing a 
common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) with broad international 
applicability would be an adequate approach to taxing the globalized and 
digitalized world economy. This approach would take into account assets 
invested, human resources employed and sales generated/destined. 
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Consolidation in this context means that, rather than individual jurisdictions, 
the overall distribution of the above-mentioned factors (capital, labour, sales) 
would be taken into account to allocate the tax base. We see important 
benefits of this approach with regard to the simplicity and certainty of 
taxation, the lowering of compliance costs, the internalization of unwanted 
spillover effects and a further facilitation of cross-border trade and 
investment. As the European Union is moving in the direction of 
implementing a CCTB and, subsequently, a CCCTB, we urge G20 leaders to 
explore opportunities for the scaling-up of this initiative. 
 
That the G20 promotes and facilitates: a) the organization of a Special Group 
of countries (composed by Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand,  
Thailand and USA, as net exporters; China, Korea, Japan, Russia and Saudi 
Arabia as main net importers; and India  as a top trader, b) that, within the 
institutional space in WTO, a permanent Secretariat is established to convene 
the Group for the purpose of dialogue, exchange of information and progress 
in special trading arrangements to facilitate a freer global trade in food 
among them and a greater market stability worldwide.  
 
G20 leaders should promote the use of new technologies to fight trade 
mispricing and misinvoicing 
 
We ask G20 leaders to jointly promote the use of digital technologies, such 
as blockchain technology, as an instrument to improve the transparency and 
security of trade flows. This includes making tax and customs administrations 
fit for such purpose and enabling them to exchange the necessary 
information by means of public infrastructure investments and capacity 
development. We further ask G20 leaders to provide the necessary means to 
support low- and lower-middle-income countries in their own digitalization 
agenda, in order to enable them to take part in the exchange of such 
information and to benefit from a better control of trade flows.  
 
Additional measures to tackle current challenges in the taxation of the digital 
economy are presented in the T20 Policy Brief on "Digital Trade and Digital 
Taxation". 
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